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B ack in 1997, when 37 industrialized countries and the European Commu-nity committed themselves to reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as part of the Kyoto Protocol, the public debate 
focused largely on how to design a single global market for trading carbon permits 
as “the” vehicle to address global climate change. Because one ton of a greenhouse 
gas emitted anywhere in the world has the same climate change consequences for 
everyone, a single global market would be an economically desirable outcome, 
equalizing incentives to reduce emissions everywhere. However, this late-1990s 
dream of a top-down global design now seems far away, if not impossible.
Instead, we see a multiplicity of regional, national, and even subnational markets 
emerging, most notably the Emissions Trading System set up by the European 
Union in 2005, but also including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the 
northeastern United States, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme, and (on 
the horizon) California, Quebec, Australia, and South Korea, as shown in Figure 1. 
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The Clean Development Mechanism, set up as part of the Kyoto Protocol, has its 
own signifi cant market for certifi ed emission reductions undertaken by developing 
countries that can be used for compliance in other programs.
Thus, unlike back in 1997, we now have experience with actual carbon markets. 
Carbon markets are now the largest class of environmental or emissions trading 
markets in the world, in terms of both volume and market value, by a very wide 
margin. (Although other greenhouse gases may be included, we use the term 
“carbon market” because carbon dioxide is the dominant gas in terms of its overall 
contribution to global warming and because the units of trade are always denomi-
nated in terms of “carbon dioxide equivalent.”)
This turn of events raises interesting questions of why the Kyoto model has 
not panned out, and why a growing number of jurisdictions nonetheless continue 
to pursue emission reductions in the absence of an agreement among all major 
emitters to reduce emissions. We will not try to answer those questions here, but we 
direct interested readers to work by Aldy and Stavins (2007) on international climate 
architectures, and Victor (2008) and Nordhaus and Boyer (1998) on problems with 
the Kyoto approach. Instead, we want to focus on what we have learned about the 
design and operation of carbon markets, and what new challenges we face.
In the next section, we begin with an overview of the major existing carbon 
markets (along with several incipient markets) and some of their key design features. 
With this background in place, we then spell out a number of lessons gleaned from 
the functioning of these markets—lessons about the reductions in carbon emis-
sions; effects on end-users of energy; the risk of “leakage” of carbon emissions to 
jurisdictions not included in the carbon market; reducing the risks of overly high or 
volatile prices for carbon allowances; the role for banking of emissions credits; the 
Figure 1
Timeline for Selected Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Programs
Source: Authors.
Notes: “CDM” stands for the Clean Development Mechanism, which was set up as part of the Kyoto 
Protocol. “RGGI” stands for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which operates in the northeastern 
United States.
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role for “offsets,” which reduce emissions among unregulated sources; and the role 
for government regulatory oversight of these new fi nancial markets.
The growth of a multiplicity of carbon trading programs has also raised ques-
tions that were not fully anticipated or understood during the design stages of 
existing carbon market systems. Now that these separate carbon markets exist, how 
might they be linked? How should carbon markets address the inevitable need for 
occasional changes in the underlying government - set rules? As countries approach 
carbon abatement with a mixture of different policy tools—an emission trading 
program, an emission tax, a performance standard, or traditional regulation—how 
can the overall intensity of different countries’ abatement efforts be compared? In 
the decentralized, bottom-up carbon market and climate policy landscape that is 
emerging, how can international negotiations best contribute to further progress?
The importance of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of carbon 
markets as they emerge is enormous, in both environmental and economic terms. 
Carbon dioxide is a fundamental product of the combustion of fossil fuels, and 
fossil fuels are the source for over 80 percent of US and global energy consumption. 
More than 30 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide per year are emitted globally 
from fossil fuel combustion (Boden, Marland, and Andres 2011). The market value 
of one year of allowances for these emissions at $10 per ton of carbon, for example, 
would be $300 billion; at $25 per ton it would be $750 billion.1 For higher allow-
ance prices, or aggregating across several vintages of allowances, the potential value 
of these hypothetical allowances is easily in the trillions of dollars. Whether these 
numbers are taken to represent the value of the environmental impact of carbon 
dioxide emissions or the potential shifts in wealth as those emissions are constrained 
and property rights conveyed, the numbers are large. Moreover, the lessons from 
carbon markets could be relevant elsewhere as market mechanisms are applied to 
tackle other environmental and nonenvironmental problems.
The Current Status of Carbon Markets and Some Key Design Choices
As of the end of 2012, the vast majority of carbon markets around the world took 
place in fi ve arenas (each of which will be discussed below): the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading System (ETS); the Clean Development Mechanism (developed 
under the Kyoto Protocol); the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (northeastern 
United States); New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme; and voluntary markets.
The volume of trades in these markets is shown in Figure 2. The vertical axis 
showing the volume of trades is a logarithmic scale, and the fi gure demonstrates 
that the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) has to this point 
1 It would take us far afi eld to discuss climate change impacts and the many challenges of measuring 
mitigation benefts, but recent estimates by the US government suggesting a net present value of expected 
global benefi ts of roughly $25 per ton of carbon dioxide reduced provide a useful reference point (Inter-
agency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2009).
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dominated the marketplace, with far greater volumes and liquidity than any other 
market. Volumes have been increasing, both in terms of activity within markets as 
well as the creation of new markets.
The average annual price per ton of carbon dioxide is shown in Figure 3. 
Carbon prices in all markets have been falling since 2008 in response to the global 
recession. Figure 3 also includes information on futures contracts in California 
(whose fi rst compliance period begins in 2013). The following discussion provides 
an overview of major carbon markets and mentions other carbon trading programs 
that are scheduled to begin operating in the next year or so; for more details on 
other proposed and existing programs, Hood (2010) is a useful starting point.
European Union Emissions Trading System
The European Union has created by far the world’s largest market-based 
system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: the Emissions Trading System, which 
began operating in 2005 (total emissions under the cap were roughly 2.1 billion 
Figure 2
Volume of CO2 Allowance Trades
(daily average)
Source: Authors.
Notes: As of the end of 2012, the vast majority of carbon markets around the world took place in fi ve 
arenas: the European Union’s Emissions Trading System; the Clean Development Mechanism (developed 
under the Kyoto Protocol); the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (northeastern United States); New 
Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme; and voluntary markets. The volume of trades in these markets is 
shown in the fi gure. Exchange-traded volumes are through June 30, 2012 as reported by Point Carbon 
(http://www.pointcarbon.com/), RGGI CO2 Auction Tracking System (https://rggi-coats.org/eats
/rggi/), Ecosystem Marketplace/Bloomberg New Energy Finance (http://www.ecosystemmarketplace
.com/pages/dynamic/our_publications.landing_page.php). Our voluntary market data is based on 
year-end reports, and thus we have no data for 2012.
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metric tons in 2011). The program has operated in phases, with a pilot phase from 
2005 –2007 covering the power sector and certain heavy industry, a second phase 
from 2008 –2012 expanding coverage slightly, and a third phase set for 2013 –2020 
that will add a signifi cant range of industrial activity. Under the fi rst two phases, each 
of 27 EU nations (later expanded to include Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) 
submitted National Allocation Plans for total emissions of greenhouse gases to 
the European Commission. Once the plans were fi nalized, nations had signifi cant 
discretion over how to distribute emissions credits to different sectors of their econ-
omies (Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthius 2010; European Commission 2012a).
The pilot phase from 2005 –2007 was something of a test. Modest emissions 
reduction goals were enacted, but the primary goal of the pilot phase was to prepare 
for 2008, when the program would help the EU comply with its obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol. The vast majority of allowances were allocated free of charge in 
the pilot and second phases, and each nation determined the level and distribution 
of free allocation to different sectors of the economy. These national - level plans 
also specifi ed the number of offset credits emitters in each nation could purchase 
from carbon abatement projects in developing economies through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (discussed in the next section), with limits ranging from 
0 –20 percent of each fi rm’s eventual compliance obligation.
Figure 3
CO2 Allowance Prices
(nominal)
Source: Authors.
Notes: “CDM” stands for the Clean Development Mechanism, which was set up as part of the Kyoto 
Protocol. “RGGI” stands for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which operates in the northeastern 
United States. Exchange-traded prices are through June 30, 2012 as reported by Point Carbon, RGGI 
COATS, Ecosystem Marketplace/Bloomberg New Energy Finance. Our voluntary market data is based 
on year-end reports, and thus we have no data for 2012.
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Additionally, the European system is the only one where a signifi cant secondary 
market for carbon has developed, with market participants buying and selling stan-
dardized contracts up to fi ve years in advance on a variety of exchanges. While 
trading in the European system began mostly with nonstandardized over-the-
counter transactions, exchange-based trading likely surpassed over-the-counter 
volumes sometime in 2008, indicating increased levels of standardization and 
liquidity (Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthius 2010).
The European Union system has evolved in a number of important ways as it 
enters its third phase in 2013. First, rules for distributing allowances have become 
more harmonized across the EU, with national - level plans now being largely a thing 
of the past. Second, the program has expanded to cover additional sectors of the 
economy, such as aviation and petrochemicals, along with additional greenhouse 
gases, such as nitrous oxide from certain industrial activities.
Probably the biggest hiccup for the Emissions Trading System to this point 
is visible in the price data in Figure 3: namely, in 2007 the price of carbon emis-
sions collapsed to essentially zero. This situation was created by a confl uence of 
several factors. First, the goals for emission reduction in the pilot program were 
constructed under time pressure with a shortage of reliable data and were supposed 
to be relatively modest (Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthius 2010). Second, aggre-
gate emission data was unavailable until almost halfway through the pilot program, 
and when the fi rst tranche of actual emissions data was released in 2006 by the 
EU Commission, market participants realized aggregate emission levels were low 
vis-à-vis allowance supply. Third, emissions allowances in this pilot fi rst phase of 
the program could only be used between 2005 and 2007 and could not be further 
banked. The too-late realization of oversupply coupled with an inability to use 
excess allowances sparked a dramatic fall in prices. The rationale for not allowing 
banking was the desire to separate Phase II (which coincided with the fi rst Kyoto 
compliance period starting in 2008) from the pilot program period—but the conse-
quences of this decision were clear: by the fi nal quarter of 2007, spot prices were 
essentially zero, at €0.06/ton, even while contract futures prices for Phase II allow-
ances hovered above €20/ton (Point Carbon 2012). Banking is now allowed in all 
current and future phases.
The Clean Development Mechanism
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is not a cap-and-trade program, 
per se, but a vehicle for translating emissions reduction efforts in developing coun-
tries into credits that can be used to offset capped emissions elsewhere. In 2011, 
roughly 300 million tons of offsets were issued under the CDM. The CDM was 
created as part of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in order to provide additional fl exibility 
for industrialized countries to meet their specifi ed targets (United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change 2012b). Credits generated through the CDM, 
called Certifi ed Emission Reductions, now represent the second-largest market of 
carbon-denominated assets and are being used as offsets in a variety of jurisdic-
tions. (A related but smaller program called Joint Implementation was created 
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for emission reduction projects in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Discussions of CDM sometimes include this program as well.)
The number of proposed and implemented Clean Development Mechanism 
projects has grown substantially over the past fi ve years. Over 6,200 CDM projects 
have been approved and more than 1 billion offset credits have been issued (authors’ 
analysis of data from CDM/JI Pipeline, http://cdmpipeline.org). The distribution 
of offset credits was slanted heavily in early years towards a small number of projects 
that reduce industrial gases with massive global warming effects. (This focus turned 
out to be problematic, an issue we discuss in our “lessons” section.) The distribution 
of projects overall has been led by renewable energy such as wind, solar, or biomass, 
a trend that has only increased in recent years. As the industrial gas projects with 
large numbers of credits per project have become more limited, most credits are 
now issued for renewable energy, energy effi ciency, and projects that capture fugi-
tive methane emissions from landfi lls and other locations. However, the winding 
down of these high-volume industrial gas projects has also led to a decline in overall 
issuance of CDM credits since 2007 even as the volume of projects continues to rise. 
The European Union Emissions Trading System has been the main purchaser 
of Clean Development Mechanism credits. Their use, however, is limited by regu-
lations to a fraction of each member state’s cap (and, in turn, the compliance 
obligations of each facility). In aggregate, use of Certifi ed Emissions Reduction 
credits for compliance across all EU nations from 2008 through mid 2012 was 
roughly 6 percent of their total compliance obligation (based on the authors’ 
analysis of data from European Environment Agency, at http://www.eea.europa
.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/emissions-trading-viewer). In New Zealand, 
emitters purchase CDM credits for up to 100 percent of their compliance obligation, 
and in Australia, the relevant fi gure is 12.5 percent (with up to another 50 percent 
coming from domestic offset programs). In Japan, the government has purchased 
over 100 million CDM credits to reach its target under the fi rst round of the Kyoto 
Protocol; collectively, governments are expected to purchase roughly one-third of 
total CDM credits through 2012 (World Bank 2012). The CDM’s projects and rules 
continue to evolve. Currently, a variety of project types face review from the UN 
body overseeing the CDM as well as the European Union, which does not accept 
CDM credits generated from certain project types.
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
In 2005, seven northeastern US states became the fi rst collection of jurisdictions 
in the United States to agree to an emissions trading program: Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Maryland joined in 
2006, Massachusetts and Rhode Island joined in 2007, and New Jersey withdrew at the 
end of 2011. Total capped emissions were roughly 150 million metric tons in 2011. 
Known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, pronounced as “Reggie”), 
this program only covers large electricity generators, and seeks to reduce emissions 
from this sector by 10 percent below 2009 levels by 2018. Revenues from allowances—
almost all of which are auctioned—go to state governments, which have invested 
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most revenues in local renewable energy or energy effi ciency projects, while roughly 
18 percent of revenue goes to state defi cit reduction. Offsets for emitters are limited to 
just 3.3 percent and must come from projects within RGGI states, although no offsets 
have been used for compliance to date (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2012b).
After several years of operation, the program has exceeded its initial reduction 
targets, largely due to fuel switching from coal-fi red power to low-priced natural 
gas. In 2011, overall emissions were 33 percent below the program cap (Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2012a). Allowance prices have not collapsed, thanks to 
an established fl oor price in the allowance auctions. However, allowances have gone 
unsold in the auctions and have generally traded at roughly the fl oor price during 
this time.
Voluntary Markets
Voluntary carbon markets refer to a variety of organizations that allow indi-
viduals or businesses to purchase offsets from emissions reduction projects located 
around the world. Since 2002, voluntary markets have grown from $43 million in 
revenues to a peak of $705 million in 2008, and stood at $572 million as of 2011 
(Ecosystem Marketplace and Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2008–2012). Esti-
mated reductions in 2011 were 95 million metric tons. Dozens of organizations offer 
voluntary carbon offsets, with a variety of procedures and standards for monitoring 
and verifi cation of carbon reductions.
One important issue for these markets is that their standards for evaluating and 
monitoring greenhouse gas reduction projects are typically less stringent than, say, 
the Clean Development Mechanism. On one side, less stringent standards reduce 
bureaucracy and lead to lower project costs. On the other side, weaker standards 
could also lead to certifi cation of projects that do not provide their stated benefi ts 
(Benessaiah 2012).
New Zealand Emissions Trading System
New Zealand launched an emissions trading program in 2008 that by 2011 
covered roughly 32 million metric tons. The program will eventually cover almost 
all New Zealand emissions, with caps based on New Zealand’s 2008–2012 commit-
ment under the Kyoto Protocol. Since New Zealand is a small economy, the 
program was built around the idea of linking to other markets; this initially includes 
the Clean Development Mechanism but could be expanded to other national or 
regional carbon markets (such as the European Union or Australia). This feature 
has made the program vulnerable to international policy uncertainty and to issues 
surrounding the CDM. The program covers a relatively small number of large 
emitters who must reduce emissions, purchase domestic or international offsets, or 
pay $25 (New Zealand) per ton of emissions. The program has no price fl oor and 
prices have steadily declined through 2012, generally following the movements of 
CDM prices. Industries facing international competition, horticulture, and fi shing 
receive up to 90 percent free allocation, but the power sector, transportation, and 
forestry do not receive free allocations (New Zealand Government 2012).
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California, Australia, and Others
Two new carbon markets are just in the process of emerging and gaining expe-
rience. First, in California, a new cap-and-trade program held its fi rst auction in 
December 2012 in advance of its 2013 start date (over-the-counter contracts have 
been traded since at least December 2011). The trading program will initially cover 
the power sector and some heavy industry, with two-thirds of allowances auctioned. 
By 2015, it will expand to cover transportation fuels and auction 80 percent of allow-
ances. Emitters may meet up to 8 percent of their obligations through approved 
domestic offsets and in the future possibly through international forestry offsets. 
Given California’s stature as the world’s sixth-largest economy, this is a signifi cant 
new market with annual capped emissions of roughly 160 million metric tons in 
2013 and roughly 400 million metric tons by 2015.
In Australia, after a long and contentious political process, a 2011 law passed 
that requires an emissions trading program to begin in 2015. In the meantime, 
major carbon emitters will pay a steadily increasing carbon tax set by the legislation, 
though many large emitters will receive government support in the form of a large 
share of free allowances (Australian Government 2012). Much of the government 
revenues from the tax and subsequent auctions will go towards new spending on 
energy effi ciency, renewables, and technology programs, and at least half of the 
revenues will go towards increased pension payments, increased tax credits, and 
decreased income taxes for households. However, the opposition Liberal party has 
made repealing the carbon price “the top priority” on its agenda, calling into ques-
tion the policy’s viability moving forward (Australia Liberal Party 2012).
Carbon markets also exist at smaller scales, and some large ones are brewing 
in other jurisdictions. The Canadian province of Quebec has developed a market 
which will link with California. Recent legislation passed in South Korea and Mexico 
has laid the groundwork for new national-level programs beginning in 2015. China 
has established a series of regional pilot programs, while other programs under 
discussion in India, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand indicate an interest in cap and 
trade across much of Asia. Other emissions-trading proposals are currently under 
discussion or development in Brazil and Chile, among other places (Hood 2010).
Lessons from the Early Carbon Markets 
Emissions Fall, But How Much is Unclear
The presence of a consistent and signifi cantly positive price on carbon suggests 
that these trading programs should be having at least some effect on behavior 
that reduces emissions levels, but research on the extent of these reductions 
remains limited.
One way to approach the abatement question is to estimate emissions reduc-
tions based on elasticities derived from related policy simulations. A rough analysis 
of projections from the emissions trading program in the proposed US Waxman–
Markey 2009 legislation suggests that for each $10/ton increase in the price of 
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US carbon dioxide allowances, emissions from 2012–2015 would fall between 1.5 
to 6 percent compared with a scenario with no price on carbon dioxide emissions.2 
If similar economic dynamics are at play in Europe’s Emissions Trading System, an 
allowance price of $16/ton (the Phase I average) would suggest that the program 
resulted in reductions of 2– 9 percent compared with business as usual. Indeed, 
empirical research on Phase I of Europe’s ETS suggests that during 2005–2007, 
emissions fell by 2–5 percent compared with business as usual (Ellerman, Convery, 
and de Perthius 2010).
A key question for—and sometimes criticism of— current market-based policies 
concerns the degree to which they encourage long-term investment in new tech-
nologies rather than solely short-term fuel-switching and energy conservation. Early 
research into Europe’s Emissions Trading System suggests that such long-term invest-
ments may be limited (Leiter, Paolini, and Winner 2011). However, carbon markets 
may be still too new to inspire the long-term confi dence to make those investments.
Allowance Allocation in the Power Sector Can Involve Important Distributional Effects
Emission allowances can be auctioned, allocated for free, or some combina-
tion of the two. There are both distributional as well as effi ciency consequences to 
allowance allocation, and these can be substantial given the sizable economic rents 
at stake. The power sector is a particularly important area of concern because of 
its large share of emissions, its universal inclusion in all existing programs, and the 
complexity of both power markets and the power market regulation infl uencing 
the distribution of costs.
In deregulated power markets where fossil-fueled generation tends to be the 
marginal producer and to set the market price, economists would expect competi-
tive pressure to lead power prices to refl ect the price that is placed on carbon 
content, regardless of any free allocation. Consequently, end users of electricity 
would ultimately end up paying for compliance costs. In Germany, for example, 
power generators received carbon allowances for free, and then passed along the 
opportunity costs of these free allowances to their customers, allowing generators 
to extract rents roughly comparable to their proportion of freely allocated allow-
ances (Ellerman and Joskow 2008; Sijm, Hers, Lise, and Wetzelaer 2008; Ellerman, 
Convery, and de Perthius 2010). This market outcome was completely predictable, 
though not warmly received by the public (Gow 2006; Harrison 2009).
There are several possible responses to concern over the costs of free allow-
ances being passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices. After providing 
substantial free allocations early on, the European Commission has more recently 
limited free allocations of carbon allowances to electricity generators, and it will 
sharply increase the proportion of allowances sold at auction in its third phase 
(European Commission 2012c). Other programs have varied in their approach, 
2 Authors’ analysis of data from Energy Information Administration, “Energy Market and Economic 
Impacts of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.”  Similar ranges can be 
estimated from other analyses.
Richard G. Newell, William A. Pizer, and Daniel Raimi     133
with New Zealand giving no free allocations to the power sector and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative giving very few, while Australia will give substantial but 
temporary free allocations to its coal-heavy power fl eet.
When free allocations in the power sector are eliminated, governments take the 
impact of the emissions trading program on consumer power prices as given and 
redistribute the rents from auctioning in a more acceptable manner. The opposite 
approach is to try to limit the higher prices to consumers. For example, cost-of-
service regulation could prevent generators from passing through the opportunity 
costs of carbon permits to consumers even with free allocations to generators. 
In California’s program, free allowances will be provided to the power sector on 
the condition that they use those allowances to reduce costs for ratepayers. Other 
proposals to direct free allocations to local power distribution companies or to 
pursue tradable performance standards, instead of cap and trade, refl ect similar 
efforts to alter the distributional impacts on electricity consumers (for example, 
Aldy 2011). By limiting the effect on consumer power prices, however, all of these 
approaches reduce the incentive to conserve electricity.
Part of the motivation for depressing consumer power prices is that carbon 
pricing, or anything else that raises power prices, disproportionately harms low-
income households (Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf 2009). Rather than limiting 
the increase in power prices, a number of mechanisms have been proposed to 
ameliorate the regressiveness of carbon pricing, including lump-sum rebates to 
households (so-called “cap-and-dividend”) and parallel offsetting changes to 
income or social security taxes (Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2010). From an effi -
ciency point of view, these are better compensation mechanisms vis-à-vis depressing 
power prices and, in the case of tax reform, take advantage of opportunities to 
lower distortionary taxes.
 Signifi cant Competitiveness Effects and Emissions Leakage Have Not Yet Emerged
Another motivation for depressing the impact of carbon pricing on energy prices 
has been the concern that emission-related activities, particularly energy-intensive 
industries facing outside competition, will relocate to an unregulated jurisdictions 
when faced with an emissions trading program that raises production costs. This 
concern involves an environmental angle—that emission reductions are simply 
being shifted outside the boundaries of the trading program—referred to as emis-
sions “leakage.” It also involves an economic angle—that local industries are being 
harmed to the advantage of industries abroad, who can be viewed as skirting their 
environmental responsibilities ( Jaffe, Peterson, Portnoy, and Stavins 1995). Facing 
the practical constraint of a less-than-global response to a global externality, efforts 
to limit price changes and leakage through various allocation incentives may even 
be cost-effective (Fischer and Fox 2009). Rather than depress local price increases, 
programs could also attempt to adjust foreign prices at the border, although this 
approach raises controversial legal and practical issues (van Asselt and Brewer 2010).
Even without explicit efforts among existing programs to depress carbon-related 
energy price increases, signifi cant competitiveness impacts and leakage have yet to 
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emerge. For the early phases of Europe’s Emissions Trading System, a (limited) empir-
ical literature indicates that competitive losses appear to have been small. Ellerman, 
Convery, and de Perthius (2010) found “no observed impact” on competitiveness 
in the oil refi ning, cement, aluminum, or steel sectors during Phase I. Demailly and 
Quirion (2008) found that Phase I created only a small loss of competitiveness in 
the iron and steel sectors. Lacombe (2008) found a similar limited impact on the 
refi ning sector during Phase I. An analysis of Europe’s aluminum sector by Reinaud 
(2008) found no statistical evidence of negative competitiveness impacts from the 
program. The only countervailing evidence comes from a survey of fi rm managers 
(215 respondents across all affected industries in the European Union) where 
55 percent of metals manufacturers and 44 percent of pulp/paper and cement/
lime/glass manufacturers stated they have either moved or are considering moving 
out of Europe’s carbon market compliance zone; 14 percent of the remaining fi rms 
stated they have moved or are considering such a move (Point Carbon 2011).
These observed competitiveness impacts generally fall below the levels 
predicted by some earlier analyses (Aldy and Pizer 2008; Ho, Morgenstern, and 
Shi 2008; Interagency Competitiveness Analysis Team 2009). This may refl ect the 
modest targets for greenhouse gas reduction implemented in the fi rst phase of 
the European System. It may also refl ect the consequences of free allocation to 
many energy-intensive industrial sectors. Despite the above-noted trend towards 
auctioning allowances in the power sector, these industrial sectors continue 
to receive signifi cant free allocations. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see 
Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthius (2010, chap. 4).
Limited evidence also suggests that leakage in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative has been small, despite some early concerns and analysis to the contrary. 
Some research had suggested leakage rates could range from 28 percent with 
$3/ton prices to 90 percent with $7/ton prices (Chen 2009; Wing and Kolodziej 
2009). However, low carbon prices resulting from a weak economy and historically 
low natural gas prices appear to have prevented extensive leakage in RGGI (Kindle, 
Shawhan, and Swider 2011).
A Variety of Tools Can Be Used to Manage Concerns about Costs and Volatility
Newly started carbon markets face substantial uncertainty over costs and, even 
though many markets have seen low prices in 2012, program designers still seek to 
prevent the risk that allowance prices might exceed economically and politically 
tolerable levels. Research on climate policy instrument choice under uncertainty 
also suggests that policies exhibiting stable prices and less-certain emissions, as typi-
cally associated with a carbon tax, have higher expected net benefi ts than policies 
where emissions are fi xed and prices fl uctuate—as in a rigid cap-and-trade system 
(Pizer 2002; Newell and Pizer 2003).
Carbon trading programs have typically turned to one or more of the following 
three types of cost management. First, regulators can impose a price ceiling, 
allowing emitters to purchase unlimited (or a relatively large volume of ) allow-
ances directly from the government at the ceiling price. For example, participants 
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in the California and Quebec programs will be able to purchase credits from the 
government for $40 –$50/ton, essentially capping trading prices (Western Climate 
Initiative 2012). Australia has established a carbon tax for the fi rst two years of their 
program, allowing unlimited emissions at $23 (in Australian dollars) and placing a 
binding cap on emissions only in 2015 (Australian Government 2012).
Second, regulators can employ price fl oors to prevent market prices from 
falling below a certain level. Auction price fl oors—where allowances are kept out of 
circulation unless purchasers are willing to pay a minimum price—have been used 
in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and in California, and are part of antici-
pated programs in Australia and Quebec. In California’s November 2012 allowance 
auction, for example, only 14 percent of the 2015 allowances sold at the minimum 
price of $10, leaving 86 percent unsold (California Air Resources Board 2012). Price 
fl oors clearly reduce cost uncertainty by limiting low-cost outcomes. But in limiting 
the possibility of very low prices, these mechanisms can unlock opportunities for 
negotiation on other features—such as the cap, offset provisions, and/or price 
ceilings—to reduce the possibility of high costs. As we have seen in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, price fl oors can continue to provide an incentive for 
emissions reductions even if the imposed cap is not binding. Supporting these 
efforts, theoretical work has showed that price-like modifi cations within a cap-and-
trade program—ceilings and fl oors on the allowance price or otherwise adjusting 
the cap to accommodate cost shocks—can help to achieve the same outcomes as 
a carbon tax, where the cost is certain (Newell, Pizer, and Zhang 2005; Murray, 
Newell, and Pizer 2009).
A third approach is to allow high carbon market prices to trigger provisions 
that relax constraints of the program other than the cap itself. If carbon prices 
reach $7/ton, for example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative allows emitters 
to purchase more carbon offsets to meet their compliance needs than is otherwise 
allowed. If prices reach $10/ton, emitters may purchase still more offsets to reach 
their targets. Unlike explicit expansion or contraction of the emission cap through 
allowance sales at a fi xed price, the exact impact of these mechanisms is less trans-
parent. On the one hand, the capacity of offset markets to expand in response to 
newly triggered RGGI demand may not be suffi cient to ward off higher prices. On 
the other hand, if offset markets do respond quickly, prices could spike then fall, 
creating additional volatility.
The Flexibility to Trade Allowances over Time — Banking and Borrowing— Can 
Smooth Uncertain Cost Shocks with Minimal Environmental Consequence
Emissions of carbon dioxide and most of the other greenhouse gases remain 
in the atmosphere for decades if not centuries, and the accumulated stock of such 
emissions is what leads to environmental problems. In other words, the timing of 
emissions in terms of day, month, or year is not consequential for climate impact. 
This intuition lies behind the aforementioned preferences for stable prices. Allowing 
fl exibility through banking or borrowing of allowances across time, even without 
turning to price fl oors and ceilings, can smooth out prices and costs, increasing 
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cost-effectiveness without additional harm to the climate (Fell, MacKenzie, and 
Pizer 2012).
In this way, banking carbon allowances can be a partial response to concerns 
about uncertain costs (although the problem remains if costs are headed perma-
nently higher or lower). Without trading between periods, cost shocks have to 
be absorbed immediately. Europe’s experience during the fi rst phase of its Emis-
sions Trading System, which did not allow banking, provides a prime example. 
Facing unexpectedly low compliance costs, prices for carbon allowances collapsed. 
Unlimited banking is now allowed in all carbon trading programs, though few 
allow borrowing. An emerging question is how much banking an emissions trading 
system can (and perhaps should) support. For example, recent estimates suggest 
market participants in the European Union system are banking nearly 2.5 billion 
allowances, roughly 119 percent of Phase II’s annual cap, for carryover into 
Phase III (Neuhoff, Schopp, Boyd, Stelmakh, and Vasa 2012). For reference, the 
US sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program saw banking levels of over 6 million tons 
in 1998, or roughly the volume of the annual cap (Stavins 1998).
Policies that allow banking of carbon allowances do face some challenges. 
Banking links expectations over time, so prices today depend on expected prices 
tomorrow. Depending on the government’s level of commitment to the policy and 
the public’s perception of that commitment, this can be a good or bad thing. (We 
return to the issue of future policy adjustments below.) Recent low prices in Europe, 
for example, have been linked to questions about whether an aggressive renewables 
policy will depress carbon prices in the future (Grubb 2012).
Another issue raised by the potential movement of allowances across time is the 
trading ratio that should be applied to banked or borrowed allowances, and how 
this rate should be applied. Theory suggests that the optimal trading ratio between 
periods is equal to one plus the discount rate, minus the desired rate of change in 
permit prices (Leiby and Rubin 2001). In addition to this formula, a discount rate is 
required, which raises a distinct set of analytical challenges, for both the estimation 
of damages and the rate at which the carbon price should rise (Interagency Working 
Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2009; Aldy et al. 2010; National Research Council 
2010). In practice, banking has faced a trading ratio of unity, sometimes coupled 
with very limited amounts of borrowing. Where allowed, large-scale borrowing has 
typically faced a trading ratio equivalent to one plus a discount rate (in Kyoto, this 
was a trading ratio of 1.3 over fi ve years; under the Waxman-Markey legislation, the 
discount rate would have been 8 percent per year).
Offsets Can Provide Low-Cost Mitigation Options, but Raise Complex Issues
Offsets allow mitigation activities outside a cap-and-trade system to count against 
the cap, expanding the scope of potential responses and thereby lowering costs. 
Developing-country emissions offsets, in particular, offer a very large potential pool of 
inexpensive compliance opportunities for industrialized nations, relative to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions within their own borders (Weyant and Hill 1999). Domestic 
or local offsets can also offer cost savings while keeping investments and cash fl ow 
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at home, but represent a smaller universe of activities compared to international 
offsets. Although specifi c provisions and restrictions vary, all programs to date employ 
offsets in some capacity. However, diffi culties arise in assuring that offsets provide 
actual reduction in emissions and that the subsidy effect from offset crediting is not 
creating perverse outcomes. In addition, as fi nancial fl ows to offset projects grow, 
attention can shift to questions of distribution as well as effi ciency.
For offsets to reduce emissions, credits can only be given to projects (and for 
measurable reductions) that would not have occurred without the offset credit 
program. At the same time, rigorous screening creates transaction costs that eat into 
potential cost savings. In practice, offset programs must strike a balance, and a variety 
of approaches have emerged (Hall 2007). As the world’s largest offset program, 
the Clean Development Mechanism has pioneered many of these approaches, and 
considerable research indicates that it has resulted in real emission reductions taken 
as a whole. However, it is easy to fi nd subcategories of projects where researchers 
question whether the reductions were real (Lambert 2011; Zhang and Wang 2011). 
The most problematic example from the Clean Development Mechanism 
involves HFC -23, a compound produced primarily as a by-product in the production 
of refrigerants in developing countries. As a by-product, HFC -23 is typically vented 
to the atmosphere where it has roughly 10,000 times the global warming potential 
(ton-for-ton) compared to carbon dioxide (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 2012a). Because of its high global warming potential, projects 
that destroy the HFC -23 by-product receive large amounts of credits—enough to 
make it profi table to increase operations that emit HFC -23 in the present, just 
to destroy more HFC -23 in the future. Lambert (2011) found evidence of such 
behavior in the fi rst few years of the program, leading the European Commission 
(and later Australia and New Zealand) to disallow such credits and encouraging the 
CDM itself to revise its guidelines concerning HFC -23 and similar gases.
Forestry offset projects have also been a particularly thorny issue, as carbon 
stored in stands of trees is —by its nature—diffi cult to guarantee and deforestation 
avoided in one area can easily crop up in another. Yet the allure of preserving forests 
while sequestering carbon has attracted tremendous interest. Currently, California 
allows certain forestry offsets, as do many voluntary programs. The European system 
does not allow forestry or land-use change projects (Kim et al. 2008). New Zealand 
has included domestic forestry under its national cap. The complexity in dealing 
with forestry has led to a variety of proposals that continue to be debated (Murray, 
Galik, Mitchell, and Cottle 2012).
As the use of international offsets grows, a variety of distributional questions 
can arise due to the transfer of resources from higher-income nations to developing 
nations. Through 2011, by far the largest share of projects and credits were going to 
China and India. In fact, between 2006 and 2011, over half of each year’s Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism credits went to projects in China—topping out at 75 percent in 
2007 (data from CDM/JI Pipeline http://www.cdmpipeline.org). Since China is the 
world’s largest carbon emitter, it is not surprising that a large share of carbon reduc-
tion projects would occur there. However, those nations or political stakeholders that 
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believe China should commit to a more stringent emissions reduction plan, or see 
China as a competitor, may object to the transfers enabled by the CDM (International 
Energy Agency 2012). More broadly, whether the CDM projects are meeting broader 
development objectives, such as economic growth or technology transfer, remains 
uncertain (Dechezlepretre, Glachant, and Menier 2008; Popp 2011).
One solution to the distributional issue is to focus international offsets on 
poorer countries; another is to emphasize regional or local offset programs. The 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and California, Quebec, and Australia each 
encourage and accept for compliance regional or local offsets, and in the case of 
Australia, a domestic offset program that encourages emissions reductions on farms 
is a central tenet of the overall program (Australian Government 2012). Even if 
local offsets are more costly, they are sometimes favored by local authorities. For 
example, regional programs in North America have thus far given preference to 
offsets from regional or domestic emissions reduction projects —although these 
programs also allow offsets to make up just a small share of compliance.
It is impossible to conclude a discussion of offsets without at least noting the 
collapse of the Clean Development Mechanism market at the end of 2012. After 
remaining around €10 –15 per metric ton for most of 2009, 2010, and the fi rst half 
of 2011, CDM prices fell steadily to less than €1 in November and December 2012. 
This has been ascribed to increased limitations on the use of CDM credits in 
the European Union, uncertainty about future demand, and increasingly robust 
supply—issues that will need to be sorted out for investors to continue to have confi -
dence in offset markets.
Market Monitoring and Oversight Must Be an Integral Feature of Cap-and-Trade 
Programs
After the 2008 fi nancial crisis, virtually all fi nancial markets came under 
new scrutiny. Carbon markets were no exception, and new proposals for trading 
programs in the United States came with calls for strong oversight. In fact, the 2010 
Dodd–Frank fi nancial reform and consumer protection bill created an interagency 
working group to conduct a study on maintaining and increasing transparency for 
carbon markets (Interagency Working Group for the Study on Oversight of Carbon 
Markets 2011). Similarly, an EU directive adopted in 2011 will signifi cantly expand 
oversight of carbon markets (European Commission 2012b). Primary goals for 
market oversight include facilitating price discovery, ensuring transparency and 
access to information, and preventing manipulation or abuse in the marketplace. 
However, European governments have come under criticism for not releasing timely 
and detailed data on individual allowance trades and holdings (de Perthius 2011).
The European Emissions Trading System has faced three high-profi le market 
controversies, two of which were not specifi c to emissions trading markets. One of 
these two cases involved traders manipulating value-added tax laws in different coun-
tries to defraud governments of over €1 billion from 2008 –2009, while the second 
involved cyber-attacks which likely stole over €50 million worth of allowances on spot 
exchanges in 2011 (de Perthius 2011; Frunza, Guegan, and Lassoudiere 2011). The 
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one major controversy unique to emission markets occurred when Clean Development 
Mechanism credits previously collected by the Hungarian government for compliance 
re-entered the market. It appears that the Hungarian government simply swapped the 
CDM credits for another type of carbon asset under the Kyoto Protocol that it needed 
to sell. While the swap was legal under the Kyoto Protocol, it was surprising to many 
participants in the European Emissions Trading System and created the appearance 
of possible credit “recycling” that would have negated relevant carbon reductions 
and diminished the integrity of the trading system (de Perthius 2011). The European 
Commission has since revised its rules to address each of these concerns.
As for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the program’s independent 
market monitor has found no major irregularities since trading began in 2008 
(Potomac Economics 2009, 2010, 2011). Market and auction data is released by 
RGGI regularly, and allowance holdings are traceable online through the program’s 
CO2 Allowance Tracking System (see http://www.rggi-coats.org for details).
The Future of Carbon Markets: New Issues
A more general lesson from the past decade is that climate policy and carbon 
markets are not static concepts, but are instead constantly evolving. The vision of 
a single, top-down global trading system has morphed into the reality of various 
national and subnational trading programs. These programs are themselves evolving 
over time as are views about the relative role of carbon markets vis-à-vis other policy 
responses. Against this backdrop, carbon markets face a variety of emerging issues.
Linking Carbon Markets
Front and center in the discussion of current carbon markets is how, whether, 
and when different markets can be “linked” so that regulated entities in one juris-
diction can use allowances or credits from another jurisdiction for compliance 
( Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins 2009). It might seem as if linking two carbon markets 
must always be a universally positive step by adding additional fl exibility for trading; 
but when carbon markets have certain characteristics, this conclusion is incorrect. 
For example, Fischer (2003) shows that linking a system that is indexed to output 
with an ordinary capped system almost always increases emissions. Researchers have 
begun to think about exactly which features have to be aligned to avoid such issues, 
and which do not (Mace et al. 2008).
In practice, linkages may be one-way or two-way (Mehling and Haites 2011). In 
a one-way linkage, credits in one system can be used for compliance in another, but 
not vice-versa. In a two-way linkage, both systems mutually allow the other’s credits 
to be used for compliance.3 It is also useful to think about even one-way linkages in 
3 Linkages can also be indirect:  If system A links to B and B links to C, A will have an indirect linkage with 
C. For example, A’s credits can be used for compliance in B, freeing up B’s credits to move into C. The 
net result would be credits leaving A and entering C.
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terms of buy-linkages and sell-linkages: that is, a buy-linkage represents the decision 
by one trading system to accept for compliance allowances or credits created and 
offered for sale by another system, while a sell-linkage represents a decision by one 
jurisdiction to allow or encourage other jurisdictions to use its allowances or credits 
for compliance. A complete two-way linkage really involves two distinct decisions 
about buying and selling by each of two jurisdictions.
Linkages among trading systems have proceeded relatively slowly so far, for 
three main reasons. First, buyers tend to be concerned about environmental 
integrity and so will be careful in accepting that purchased allowances are valid for 
compliance in their system (Mace et al. 2008). Second, the necessary harmoniza-
tion of certain design features also means that one or the other system is giving 
up some sovereign control. The result often depends on who has more power in 
the linking negotiation, which is frequently a function of the relative market size. 
Currently, for example, the European Union set the terms for Norway, Iceland, and 
Lichtenstein to enter the Emissions Trading System. In a different model, emitters 
under Australia’s program will be able to purchase European allowances overseen 
by the European Commission in 2015, while European emitters will be allowed 
to purchase allowances from Australia in 2018 (Reklev 2012). In North America, 
Quebec’s program embraces many aspects of the California design and will likely 
soon link to that much larger market (Carroll 2012).
Third, distributional concerns tend to arise, particularly in the selling system. 
For the buying system, linking lowers allowance prices with the same environmental 
outcome—something many programs desire. The main downside is faced by inves-
tors holding allowances without any corresponding obligations, or the government 
in the case of auctions. But for the selling system, linking raises allowance prices for 
carbon allowances, increasing costs for those with compliance obligations as well as 
their downstream consumers. For this reason, Australia initially planned to restrict 
international sales of its allowances, despite the net gains from trade ( Jotzo and 
Betz 2011).
 New Information and Program Revision
One of the defi ning characteristics of climate change is uncertainty about both 
mitigation costs and benefi ts as economic conditions, technologies for carbon abate-
ment, and scientifi c knowledge advance. Occasional revisions to carbon market 
policies are essential to long-term effi ciency (Murray, Newell, and Pizer 2009). While 
markets and affected stakeholders may crave certainty, governments cannot guar-
antee certainty where it does not fundamentally exist. Carbon market policies are 
certain to be revised and even overhauled as time passes.
Carbon market policy revisions have the potential to create fi nancial gains and 
losses in the carbon market. At any point in time, carbon market participants have 
both carbon assets in the form of allowances, and liabilities in the form of expected 
emissions. As expected carbon prices change, so do the balance sheets of these 
economic actors. While the same would be true for changes in carbon taxes, the 
existence of banking provisions —which link carbon prices over time through 
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the potential for arbitrage—imply that any change in future price expectations 
should also affect current prices. Like expected shifts in conventional regulation, 
expected changes in carbon market policies also affect incentives for investing in 
new, emission-related physical capital and technology, as well as the value of the 
current capital stock.
For example, as Europe’s Emissions Trading System enters its third phase in 
2013, it is reportedly considering a delay in auctioning a large share of allowances 
(roughly 900 million from 2013–2015); a delay would likely drive up prices until 
the auction date becomes certain (Allan 2012; Szabo 2012). Most European govern-
ments expected to gain from the plan, as higher prices offset lower auction volumes; 
Poland’s government has opposed the delay, however, because its auction volume 
is small and it expects to lose revenue. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative saw 
a decrease in the size of its market when New Jersey announced in May 2011 that it 
would withdraw at the end of the year (Christie 2011). However, prices were unaf-
fected, perhaps in part because they were already trading at the established price 
fl oor. In New Zealand, rules were revised to allow only one allowance to be used 
for two tons of emissions (rather than one ton) during a transition phase (Fallow 
2009). This did not substantially impact New Zealand allowances prices, which are 
closely tied to Clean Development Mechanism prices determined internationally, 
but halves the emission reduction incentive for New Zealand fi rms.
If the holders of allowances are largely the same agents who face compli-
ance obligations, the net effect of price changes on fi rms’ balance sheets could be 
relatively small, as the market value of allowances will fl uctuate along with the cost 
of their future compliance obligation. However, the specifi cs of how allowances 
are valued on balance sheets can create problems even for these businesses. For 
allowance holders that have no compliance obligations, and for those with obliga-
tions but no allowances, the fi nancial consequences of large price changes could 
be substantial.
Policy revisions cannot be avoided, but governments should strive to make them 
transparent and orderly. Regulatory agencies, courts, legislatures, and central banks 
all face the need to pursue market-sensitive decisions in a way that allows all market 
participants equal access to information as well as advance notice of the sequence 
and timing of the decision process. For example, one legislative proposal for a US 
carbon market (Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Congress) would 
have implemented a specifi c schedule for periodic fi ve-year reviews and revisions, 
with presidential submission of recommendations shortly after the compliance year 
ends and then expedited Congressional action within six months.
Another option might be to put these decisions into the hands of an oversight 
entity, similar to a central bank (Pizer and Tatsutani 2008); Newell, Pizer, and Zhang 
2005). Such an entity would be responsible for periodic reviews and changes to 
the emission limit or other rules, and would have the fl exibility to do so outside 
the explicitly political sphere. However, climate change is an issue with a continuing 
divergence of views about the appropriate level of response, even among experts, 
and the independence of an oversight entity cannot solve that problem.
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 Alternative Policies and Comparability
In addition to fi nding ourselves in a world of multiple emission trading 
regimes with varying rules, many jurisdictions are pursuing alternative policy 
approaches such as a carbon tax or more traditional regulation. For example, 
policy-related emission reductions in the United States over the past few years 
have arisen from tighter regulations on automobile fuel economy and tailpipe 
greenhouse gas emissions, renewable electricity capacity additions associated 
with federal and state subsidies and mandates, and new power plant emission 
regulations from the US Environmental Protection Agency. The European system 
only covers roughly half of European emissions, with traditional regulation used 
elsewhere (for example, with automobiles). Several European nations, such as 
Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway, also apply carbon taxes to 
certain fuel types. Australia is temporarily using a carbon tax in advance of emis-
sions trading.
This diversity of policy approaches was not altogether unexpected. Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, there is no requirement to use a carbon market as the sole tool 
to implement a domestic emissions reduction program. When the United States 
seemed closest to establishing its own cap-and-trade program in 2009 and sought to 
assuage domestic concerns about competitiveness, the proposed legislation asked 
other countries to have a “nationally enforceable and economy-wide greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction commitment for that country that is at least as stringent 
as that of the United States” without specifying emissions trading (see H.R. 2454, 
§767(c)(1), 111th Congress).
This diversity of approaches raises the need to measure the “comparability” 
of policies. Among jurisdictions with carbon markets, comparability is necessary 
for jurisdictions to consider linking. More generally, comparability among jurisdic-
tions with and without carbon markets is necessary for countries to justify continued 
domestic action on a global problem and, more specifi cally, to avoid escalating 
concerns over competitiveness and emission leakage that could threaten the sustain-
ability of policy actions. Most discussions look at emission reduction efforts in one 
of six ways: 1) emission reductions versus some year in the past; 2) reductions versus 
what would happen with a business-as-usual baseline; 3) reductions in emissions per 
unit of output (gross domestic product, energy use, power generation); 4) reduc-
tions in emissions per capita; 5) the realized carbon price; or 6) energy prices or 
price effects. There is no agreement on which metric is best, many raise practical 
issues like conversion of carbon prices among currencies or calculation of business-
as-usual forecasts, and different metrics yield dramatically different messages. This 
question of comparability is compounded when evaluating actual implementation 
of policies and their outcomes, as opposed to pledges.
International Negotiations
Earlier, Kyoto-style negotiations focused on a sequence of top-down, larger-to-
smaller emission trading issues—national emission caps, trading rules, and then 
further details, such as the Clean Development Mechanism. However, the new 
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negotiations in the aftermath of the Durban conference in late 2011 will necessarily 
focus on the tools for a bottom-up approach. On the one hand, a new agreement 
will need to support concerns over comparability and transparency of effort. Those 
countries already engaged in or pursuing carbon markets will want assurances that 
other jurisdictions will do their fair share.
A new international agreement also needs to focus on ways to provide insti-
tutional support for markets themselves. For example, some developing countries 
might benefi t from “model rules” for establishing a domestic trading program 
that would presumptively link to developed country programs already utilizing the 
Clean Development Mechanism. While rules for carbon markets and other abate-
ment programs can and may emerge organically without an anchor in international 
agreements, creating model rules could be valuable, particularly for the many 
countries that will be too small to pursue an entirely customized approach. There 
are also questions about the future of the CDM itself. Decisions in December 2012 
will limit future access to the CDM to countries participating in the next phase 
(2013 –2020) of the Kyoto Protocol. This approach steers the CDM away from a 
role in a decentralized global carbon market by limiting its relevance to the subset 
of Kyoto participants. To achieve effi ciency, future negotiations should be creating 
opportunities for linkages, not blocking them.
Conclusion
Fifteen years after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol and the creation of the fi rst 
major platform for carbon markets, the prospect for a unifi ed global carbon trading 
system in the foreseeable future is essentially fi nished. However, carbon markets 
are a reality and the design of carbon markets is benefi ting from actual experi-
ence. Experience with windfall profi ts from free allowance allocation has led to 
an increased use of auctions. Jurisdictions are learning to handle market-sensitive 
information in a more transparent and orderly manner, although progress remains 
to be made. Efforts to moderate both high and low prices are providing lessons on 
what works. Perhaps most importantly, we are seeing that carbon allowance trading 
can support emission reductions and send market signals for future investment. 
The challenge now is to fi gure out how carbon markets can work in a much more 
complex—but clearly more realistic—world.
■ David Autor, Dallas Burtraw, Denny Ellerman, Chang-Tai Hseih, Suzi Kerr, John List, 
Timothy Taylor, Robert Stavins, and Jonathan Wiener provided invaluable comments on an 
earlier draft. A longer version of this paper is available online from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (W18504) and Resources for the Future (DP-12-51).
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